Abstract
Introduction
Secure multiparty computation (SMC) has a long tradition of research. The field was introduced by Yao [7] and has been extended by Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson [12] . Mikhail J. Atallah and Wenliang Du [5] introduced the field of Secure Multiparty Computational Geometry. It is known that any multiparty computational problem can be solved using the generic technique of Yao [7] . However, generic techniques are invariably quite impractical due to their high computational and communication complexities. Recent research has therefore focused on specific secure solution for specific problems like secure surveying [13] , classification of customer data [14] . Another line of work that has attracted the attention of many researchers is the statistical privacy of databases where data is protected by data perturbation. A survey is available in [15] . Our problems can be considered as a small tribute to the age old tradition of SMC. Specifically, we begin by considering the following scenario: Party A has started a new mail service, however its spam database is not good. Party B has got a very good spam database and party A wish to find whether its particular mail is a spam or not. Party A however does no wish to disclose its mail (user trust may be hampered) while party B does not wish to disclose its spam database. In such a scenario, how can A avail the service of B putting nobody's privacy at stake? We present efficient solutions not only to the above scenario but to several such problems that can be broadly classified as problems related to privacy preserving cooperative clustering. Our solution uses the concept of Gastwirth estimators [6] which says that we tend to consider only those observations (data points) that are closer to the center of the sample or in other words least their distance is from the mean of the data. Given a set of concentric convex polygons, the inner most convex polygon represents the points that are closest to the mean and the outer most polygon is the set of data points that are most deviated from the mean. Therefore, we first decide how genuine our query is by finding in which of the concentric polygons our point lies. This is done by using secure depth computation of a point. Next, we check whether our query is exactly present in the database. This is done by using the secure computation of whether a point is a hull vertex or not. The next few subsections will informally introduce some preliminary concepts such as circuit evaluation protocol, homomorphic encryption and data perturbation. The Circuit Evaluation Protocol : In circuit evaluation protocol, a function can be represented by Boolean gates. The basic idea is to securely evaluate each Boolean gate via a sub-protocol over the network of parties. The protocol scans the circuit from input wires to output wires, processing each single gate in each of the basic steps. When entering the basic step, the parties hold (secret) shares of the values of the input wires and when the step is completed, they hold the (secret) shares of output wires. For more details, the reader may refer to [1] . Public Key Cryptography : In pubic key cryptography, a party has two different keys for encryption and decryption. This cryptosystem is also known as asymmetric cryptosystem. An algorithm is used to generate a pair of keys, one for encryption, and other for decryption. The encryption key is published while decryption key is kept secret. Furthermore, given the public key it is computationally infeasible to get the decryption key [2] . Homomorphic Encryption Scheme : A cryptographic scheme is said to be homomorphic, if its encryption scheme has the following property: E(x) * E(y) = E(x + y). Examples of such encryption schemes are plenty in literature. Damgard et al [3] and Pallier [4] have proposed such public key homomorphic cryptosystems. The advantage of such cryptosystem is that, by simply knowing the public key, anybody can perform addition, multiplication and subtraction without knowing the result or any other value. Addition is performed in the following way E(x) * E(y) = E(x+y). Subtraction is quite similar, but one has to find E(−y) and then perform E(x) * E(−y) = E(x − y). Multiplication can be done in the following way E(x) y = E(xy). Homomorphic schemes are known to be semantically secure. Data Perturbation : Data Perturbation is the method of hiding a data value by adding or multiplying some random number to the data. It is known that the method efficiently hides data in finite field.
Problem Definition and Solution
In the introduction section we have already mentioned, how the problem of availing the clustering service is related to the problems of finding the depth of a point and finding whether a query point is a hull vertex or not. We therefore begin by defining the various sub-problems and their solutions that would lead to a solution for any general private cooperative clustering service.
Definition of depth of a point
The depth of a point P in a set S is the number of hulls (convex layers) that have to be stripped from S before P is removed. The depth of S is the depth of its deepest point [6] . The depth of a point defines, how genuine a query data point is for taking into consideration for decision making. Generally an outlier often degrades the accuracy of prediction, thereby affecting the decision making process.
Privacy Preserving depth computation of a point
Party A has a query point in plane. Party B has a point set S in plane and Party A wishes to find the depth of his query point in the point set of B. A and B therefore wish to find an asymmetric protocol that can compute the depth of the query point for A without revealing more than what can be inferred from the answer.
Privacy Preserving Computation of whether a query point is a hull vertex or not
Party A has a query point. Party B has a convex polygon and party A wishes to find whether his query point is a hull vertex in B's polygon without disclosing his query point. A and B therefore wish to find an asymmetric protocol that can compute the answer for A without revealing more than what can be inferred from the answer.
Solutions to the Sub-problems
We begin by solving the following problem: Party A has a query point p. Party B has two points say q1 and q2. A wishes to compute the area generated by the three points without disclosing his point. Party B on the other hand is reluctant to disclose his points. How can A compute the area such that privacy of both the parties remains retained?
Let the co-ordinates of the point q1 and q2 be (x 1 ,y 1 ) and (x 2 ,y 2 ) and the co-ordinates of p be (x,y). Area of the triangle generated by three points is given by
In the rest of the paper, let M denote the matrix   x y 1
Note that the area is nothing but det(M )/2.
protocol: P rot Area() 1 . Party A and Party B agree upon the way in which points are to be arranged in M .
2. Party A selects 2 random numbers R1, R2, and perturbs his co-ordinates by adding these random numbers to them. He therefore gets x + R1,y + R2. He sends to B, these perturbed co-ordinates.
Party B on getting the co-ordinates
Let the above value be denoted by Area1. Party B encrypts the value with the public key of party A and gets EA(Area1).
4. Party A encrypts his random numbers (R 1,R2) using his public key cryptosystem and gets EA(R1),EA(R2) and sends these to party B.
5. Party B pre computes k1 = y2 − y1, k2 = x1 − x2.
On getting the encrypted values, Party B computes
We will denote the result as EA(V ). Party B finally com- Area2.
Claim 1: The protocol is correct
Proof : From our knowledge of geometry, we know that the product of two cross vectors A, B is area of a parallelogram and half of it is area of the triangle. Claim 2: The protocol ensures security of both the parties Proof: Privacy of party A: Let x 1 be the message of party A. Suppose party B has a probabilistic polynomial time al-
with non-negligible advantage, then any adversarial algorithm trying to break the indistinguishability of that encryption scheme can use B () as subroutine. But breaking the indistinguishability of public key cryptosystem is known to be computationally intractable. Hence a contradiction. Privacy of party B : Let B's data be x. Privacy of B can be ensured if we can prove that probability of A guessing B's value correctly is negligible, i.e.
, for all positive polynomial and sufficiently large n and x is any arbitrary value.
Proof: Note that party B perturbs his data with a random number before sending it to A. Let x = x + r where x, r {0, 1} n and size of r is equal to size of x. Let the size of x be n. Therefore the probability that A guesses the correct value of r is 1 2 n . Hence the probability that A will come to know B's value x is 1 2 n . It is known that for any positive polynomial and sufficiently large n,
The above protocol can be used for computing pointinclusion in a convex polygon problem in a privacy preserving manner. A very elegant solution has already been proposed by Atallah et.al in [5] . But we also present our noble method of the solution which is computationally equivalent to the method proposed by Atallah et.al. Our protocol is asymmetric i.e. only party A will come to know whether his query point is inside or not.
Protocol for point inclusion testing
We know that, an n sided convex polygon can be triangulated into n triangles from any internal point p of the polygon and the area of the polygon is equal to the sum of all the triangles which are the result of polygon decomposition. On the other hand, if a query point is not in the polygon, the sum of the area of the n triangles into which the polygon is decomposed will be greater than the area of the polygon. However giving the exact area of the polygon questions the privacy of the method. Therefore while giving the value of the area of the polygon, Party B adds n random numbers to the value. So when party A and B get involved in area computation of n triangles into which A's query point decomposes B's polygon, the n random numbers are added in an oblivious fashion to each of the areas of the n triangles. At the end of the protocol, if A's computed area is equal to B's perturbed area, A's query point is inside the polygon.
protocol: P oint Inclu()
Input: A's has a query point and B has a convex polygon Output: A decides whether his query point is inside B's convex polygon.
1. let e1, e2, . . . , en be the edges of convex polygon of party B.
2. Party A selects two random numbers R 1, R2 and perturbs his co-ordinate by adding these random numbers to them and therefore gets x + R1, y + R2 and sends these perturbed values to B.
3. For each edge ei Party A and B agree upon the arrangement of matrix M .
4. For each edge ei A and B runs protocol P rot−Area and at the end of n computation party A gets a value A1 + r where r is a random number added by party B.
5. Party B then computes the area of the polygon (A2) and adds r to it.
6. if A1 + r = A2 + r the point is inside else outside.
Claim 3: The protocol generates correct result
Proof : From our knowledge of geometry, we know that an n vertex convex polygon can be triangulated into n triangles with a point inside the polygon. However 
Protocol for finding depth of a query point
Assume Party B has a set of concentric polygons while Party A has a query point. Party A wishes to find in which particular polygon his point lies. Instead of checking, with each of the polygons, it is better to find the range of the polygon in which the query point lies. If a convex polygon is bounded by a bounding box, and a query point is inside the polygon, it will also be inside the bounding box. A bounding box of a convex polygon has four co-ordinates. So before checking with the polygon, it is better to check if the point is inside the bounding box. However if a point is in bounding box, it need not be in the convex polygon. Hence once decided that the point is inside the bounding box, it is necessary to check whether the point is inside the polygon or not. So in case of concentric polygons, A first decides from which particular bounding box, his point starts to be inside and then proceeds for checking with polygons in those bounding boxes. However if B comes to know about the outcome of the ranging operation, the privacy of Party A will be at stake. Therefore the protocol is designed in such a fashion that only A comes to know about the outcome of the above ranging test.
Protocol: Secure Depth()
Input: Party A has a query point(in plane) and Party B has a set of points (in plane). Output: Party A decides the depth of his point. 1 . Party B computes the convex polygon of its point set. Subsequently he computes the convex hull of his non hull vertices. As a result he gets a set of disjoint concentric convex polygons.
2. Party B gives each of these polygons an index number. Namely the innermost polygon gets the highest value while the outermost gets the lowest value.
3. Party B then sorts the polygon in decreasing order of their indices.
4. for each the polygon, Party B computes the bounding box of that polygon.
Party B then computes the area of each of these polygons
Let there be m such concentric polygons formed and let their areas be denoted as M = {Aream, . . . , Area1}. He does the same for each of the bounding boxes. Note that these polygons and the bounding boxes are arranged in the sorted fashion.
6. Party A then perturbs his coordinates by adding random numbers and gives it to party B. For each polygon, party B triangulate the polygon with party A's co-ordinates and computes area for each polygon by using protocol P rot Area. Note that these areas will be encrypted form. 8. Suppose the point lies from rectangle i to 1, then party A needs to check with polygon numbered from i to 1.
9. Suppose Party A is checking whether his point is inside polygon i. Party A using oblivious transfer gets the value Areai + ri from the set N .
Next party B encrypts the values of the set M with his public key and gets EB(Aream + rm), . . . , EB(Area1 + r1).
A selects the i th value obliviously and gets EB(Areai + ri). Party A adds a random number ri to it and sends it to B. Call this value to be A1.
11.
A adds r i to Areai + ri + ri . Call this value to be A2.
They check if
A 1 = A2.
The protocol continues until the point inclusion test becomes
true. But in order to disguise party B, the protocol has to run m number of times and in arbitrary fashion. The greater the index of the polygon, the greater is the depth of the point.
Claim 5: The protocol generates correct result
Proof : From geometry we know that a bounding box of a convex polygon bounds all the points inside the polygon. Therefore if a point is not in a bounding box, it cannot be in that polygon. Claim 6: The protocol maintains privacy of both the parties Proof : Similar to the proof of Claim 2. The method can be thought in light of k − medoid method of clustering. In k − medoid method of clustering there exists a representative object for each of the clusters. The representative object is the medoid which is most centrally located object in a cluster. So given a set of clusters, which are compact clouds and are well separated from each other, then k − means is analogous to k − medoid clustering, since the mean will lie centrally. So suppose we have a set of clusters which are cloud like compact and if we build concentric convex polygons for the points in each cluster, then the inner most convex polygon forms the representative object for the cluster. More to that, to each of the clusters, the set of convex polygons is doing a further hierarchical decomposition of the point sets and to each of such decomposition, a weight can be assigned. Given a query point, based on the weight of the polygon to which it lies, it can be decided how seriously a query point has to be taken.
We now turn our attention to Point Location problem, the solution to which is very similar to the solution of Depth of a Point problem. Party B first computes the bounding boxes for each polygon. Party B then computes the area of each of the polygons and their bounding boxes. Party A first checks in which of the bounding boxes his query point lies by point inclu() protocol. Suppose A discovers some k bounding boxes. Next party A checks in the polygons of those k bounding boxes and decides in which polygon his point lies.
Protocol: hull vertex
This method is helpful when party A is willing to find whether his query point is in party B's dataset or not. We know that convex hull is a bounding polytope of a set of points. Each hull vertex is an extreme point in some respect. Now if a point has to overlap the hull vertex, it has to hit the point both in terms of x and y co-ordinates. In 1986, Yao [7] introduced a problem known as Yao's millionaire problem. But his problem was one dimensional. Therefore, the solution for that problem cannot be directly applied for multidimensional case. A discussion can be found in Atallah [8] and Cachin [9] . However there they wish to find whether a set of points of one party dominates the set of point of the other party whereas in our case we need to know whether two points collide or not. Our protocol for the problem needs a privacy preserving equality testing protocol. Sufficient study and elaborate discussion about privacy preserving equality testing has been discussed by Fagin et al [10] . Assume that there are n number of vertices in B's convex polygon. We will denote those points as (x 1 , y 1 ), . . . , (x n , y n ) . We denote the query point of party A as (x, y).
protocol: hull vertex()
Input: Party A has a query point and Party B has a polygon. Output: Party A decides whether his query point is a hull or not.
1. Party B encrypts each of his co-ordinates (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) and gets (EB(x1), EB(y1)),. . ., (EB(xn), EB(yn)).B sends these values to party A.
Party A computes (−x, −y) and encrypts these values with B's public key and gets EB(−x), EB(−y)
.He also generates a set of n random numbers namely {r1, . . . , rn}.
On getting the set (EB(x1), EB(y1)),. . .,(EB(xn), EB(yn)),
Party A does the following: We will now discuss how this method can be helpful when the dataset of party B is large and party A is willing to find the depth of his query point and whether his point is in party B's dataset. Suppose party B has k strictly disjoint clusters. For each cluster party B builds a set of concentric polygon. Let m be the largest number of concentric polygons that any cluster has. For each concentric polygon in each cluster, B computes the bounding box of that polygon. Note that the bounding box of the outermost polygon in any set of concentric polygons for any cluster forms the bounding box for all the points in that cluster and that can be used for ranging a query. Party A first checks in which of the k rectangles his query point lies. Let the point lies in the i th rectangle (that is in the i th cluster). Also assume that there are j concentric polygons in the i th cluster. Party A now needs to find in which of the j rectangular boxes in i th cluster his query point lies and that has to be done without letting party B know that A is querying the i th cluster. This step is very easy and is equivalent to getting the i th string out of k strings where each string l is a concatenation of areas of the concentric rectangles in the cluster l and this can be done using a communication complexity of O(m * d) where d is the number of bits required to represent any data and m is the maximum number of concentric polygons any cluster has. Now using similar oblivious string extraction technique and the methods explained in the paper party A can compute the depth of his query point and find whether his query point is in B's data set.
We will now discuss how this method can be helpful when the dataset of party B is large and party A is willing to find the depth of his query point and whether his point is in party B's dataset. Suppose party B has k strictly disjoint clusters. For each cluster party B builds a set of concentric polygon. Let m be the largest number of concentric polygons that any cluster has. For each concentric polygon in each cluster, B computes the bounding box of that polygon. Note that the bounding box of the outermost polygon in any set of concentric polygons for any cluster forms the bounding box for all the points in that cluster and that can be used for ranging a query. Party A first checks in which of the k rectangles his query point lies. Let the point lies in the i th rectangle (that is in the i th cluster). Also assume that there are j concentric polygons in the i th cluster. Party A now needs to find in which of the j rectangular boxes in i th cluster his query point lies and that has to be done without letting party B know that A is querying the i th cluster. This step is very easy and is equivalent to getting the i th string out of k strings where each string l is a concatenation of areas of the concentric rectangles in the cluster l and this can be done using a communication complexity of O(m * d) where d is the number of bits required to represent any data and m is the maximum number of concentric polygons any cluster has. Now using similar oblivious string extraction technique and the methods explained in the paper party A can compute the depth of his query point and find whether his query point is in B's data set.
Complexity Analysis
One of the core reasons for devising specific solution for secure multiparty problems are to reduce the communication complexity. So the meta-theorem behind reducing communication complexity strategy is to convert as many as possible global computations to local computations. We assume, the individual size of the data to be l, that is l is the number of bits required to represent a data. The communication complexity for point-inclusion problem is O(nl) whereas a general circuit will take O(nl 2 ) oblivious transfers (Because this problem involves O(n) number of multiplication and individual multiplication takes quadratic circuit depth). For depth of a point, we consider that there are m rectangles formed and each polygon has n number of vertices. So in total mn number of data points. Our total communication complexity turns out to be O(m + k) * n * l where k is the number of times the protocol has to be repeated. In the worst case where all the concentric polygons are very closely packed k will turn out to be m. The same is the complexity for point location problem. General circuit evaluation protocol will take O(mnl 2 ) oblivious transfers.
Applications
1) Company A is a service company which has recently entered into market, has received some complaints about its service. Being new to the business, it does not know which complaint should be dealt with importance and which one can be considered as a outlier. Company B is a major player in the market, and has a large collection of complaint database and can help A in the process. However A is not ready to disclose its complaint (because it may directly reveal the shortcomings of the company), while B is not ready to disclose his complaint database.
2) Company A's system recently got affected by a virus and therefore wishes to find how to deal with the virus. Company B has a large database of information regarding viruses and ways to deal with it. However A is not ready to disclose the name of the virus (because that may indirectly reveal the vulnerabilities of A's systems), while B is not ready to give its entire database.
Both the above intriguing problems are representatives from a large class of privacy preserving collaboration services that are comfortably and efficiently solved by our algorithms.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we have studied the problems of finding secure depth of a point and finding whether a query point is a hull vertex or not and have seen how this problems can help in establishing a cooperative clustering service. However the study has been carried out for two dimensional dataset. Extending the approach for multi dimensional dataset will be an interesting research task.
